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The Reality of Redistribution
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University of Arizona
This discussion is rather unusual in that I cannot remember the 
rather simple point made in it ever having appeared in the literature. 
This may indicate that I have been careless in my reading, so I hope 
that any of you who have seen it before will let me know.
That there is a tradeoff between redistribution of income and the 
total production of society and its rate of growth is believed by every 
one, although there is little empirical evidence. Okun actually wrote a 
full book on this subject, coining the phrase: "the leaky bucket." One 
aspect of the tradeoff, however, seems to have been ignored. I shall 
begin my discussion of this point with a little example using numbers 
that I have simply drawn out of the air.
The reader will quickly realize that the importance of the phenome 
non depends very heavily on these numbers. Thus, this example is 
intended as illustrative only. After I have presented the example, we 
will turn to discussing what effect different numbers would have, con 
sider social mobility, and deal with risk aversion. This part of the chap 
ter is, at least subjectively, original. In order to deal with some likely 
objections, at the end I will repeat some arguments I have used before 
on relative deprivation and international transfers, and then turn to a 
few remarks on charitable motivation.
Redistribution and Growth
Let us assume, then, that the United States government takes mea 
sures to supplement the income of the bottom 20 percent by an average 
of 50 percent, funding the transfer by an income tax on the upper 80 
percent. Let us assume it does this in some reasonably efficient way 
without going into details. This should slow down the rate of growth at
127
128 The Reality of Redistribution
least somewhat, and for purposes of this example I will assume the rate 
of growth falls from 5 percent a year to 3 percent.
As a result of this, the local GNP 15 years in the future will be 
enough smaller than it would have been had we not retarded growth by 
this scheme that the people in the bottom one-fifth of the population 
will receive lower incomes than they would have received had the 
transfer not been made. 1 Further, they will continue to receive lower 
incomes throughout all eternity with the differences steadily getting 
greater. The upper 80 percent were worse off from the word go unless 
they received enough satisfaction from helping the poor to compensate. 
In any event, they will be worse off even with the strong charitable 
motives after 15 years.
Figure 1 shows that situation. The line UU and the line LL are the 
income of the upper 80 percent, and the lower 20 percent without 
transfers. The line UP and the line LP are the post-transfer lines. The 
lines cross at 15 years for the poor, and UP is everywhere below UU 
for the well-off. The reality illustrated in this figure raises at least three 
questions, two regarding the purpose of the transfer scheme, the third a 
deep ethical question that economists tend to ignore.
The first question that we need to ask is whether this transfer has 
benefited the poor. Certainly this would depend upon a number of 
things, but most important the age of the poor person, his or her dis 
count rate, and the effect of the transfer on the growth rate of his or her 
income. Ceteris paribus, young people would tend to regard the 
tradeoff as decidedly negative while poor people who happen to be the 
same age as the current ruler of China, Deng Hsiao-Ping, would think 
it a bargain. If poverty is primarily an affliction of the young and old, 
we have the house that redistribution is intended to benefit much 
divided. The public choice implications of this situation should be 
obvious.
The second question that comes to my mind relates to the intergen- 
erational transfer resulting from any policy that reduces the growth 
rate. To look at it from the standpoint of all poor people (or the charita 
ble well-off), the scheme would mean that in the future all poor people 
are poorer than they otherwise would be. On the other hand, with the 
economy growing anyway, people who are made poorer, i.e., the poor 
in the future, would nevertheless be better off than the people who are 
poor right now. Thus, it could be regarded as a transfer from the future
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population—rich, poor, and middle-class—to the bottom 20 percent
now/






It is not obvious that this is undesirable. It is similar to the situation 
in which we deliberately retard investment now in order to raise cur 
rent consumption with the full knowledge that the consumption in the 
future will be lowered, but will still be higher than it is now. However, 
this thinking seems only to be pertinent to affluent societies, since it is 
the reverse of the position taken by most development economists. 
What we frequently find in this literature is the recommendation that 
people should be compelled to increase their savings because the 
reduction in present consumption would be more than paid for by the 
increase in future consumption. 3
This effect can be shown on the same diagram as we have given 
above. All that is necessary is to assume that the UP and the LP lines 
are the status quo with which we start before the transfer. The govern 
ment then takes money from the poor and gives it to the well-off, thus
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generating PP and the UU lines. This would effectively involve a tax 
on the poor. 4 Of course, the development economists never actually 
proposed this kind of thing. They were simply going to put a general 
tax on the present generation and use it to subsidize capital accumula 
tion, including human capital accumulation. Their idea was to cause 
higher growth. They normally talked about helping the poor, but as a 
matter of fact, most of the taxes were drawn from the poorest of the 
poor, the farmers, and the principal beneficiaries were civil servants 
and other government associates who are far from poor.
In any event, these programs have not worked but the basic reason is 
not that there was anything wrong with the theory. It was that actual 
implementation was very badly done. The famous bridge over the 
lower Congo connecting one dirt track with another dirt track is only 
one of many examples. 5
Most economists would agree that this program of taking funds 
from the poor and giving them to the well-off would accelerate growth, 
and you will note that all of the arguments we have made before are 
reversed here. After a short period of time the poor would be better off. 
In this case, since the poor are better off in the future rather than now, 
transferring money from the present day poor who are very poor to the 
future poor who, although poor by the standards of the future, are bet 
ter off, enhances the regressive-nature of the income transfer.
Some Ethical Questions
Redistributionists seem to think that they occupy the moral high 
ground. As I have said on other occasions, I am puzzled by the habit of 
discussing redistribution within a narrow geographical context. In most 
discussions of income redistribution, the really poor people in the 
world—people who live in places like Africa, India, and China—are 
left out. The homeless in Tucson are bad-off by American standards, but 
by the standards of India, they are rather well-off. They are certainly 
vastly better-off than the street people of Calcutta or the street children 
of Columbia. They are also in many dimensions better-off than their 
own ancestors were a few generations back. Their medical attention in 
particular is better than anything available until very recently.
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In any event, the decision to lower the rate of growth in the United 
States by making income transfers will reduce the rate of growth in 
other countries. We are connected to them by international trade and, 
perhaps more important, by the trade in ideas, particularly the ideas for 
new or improved devices. When the production of these falls off, living 
standards will fall or perhaps simply not grow as rapidly in the rest of 
the world. This nexus can only make the Tightness of redistribution 
more ambiguous.
The tendency of redistributionists to be much more concerned for 
the people of their own nation is an interesting phenomenon. Tucson is 
only 100 miles from the Mexican border, and a great deal of money is 
spent by the federal, state, and local governments in helping the poor in 
Tucson, most of whom even without that help would be better off than 
the average Mexican. All of them would be better off than the most 
impoverished Mexicans. To repeat, I find this curious, but most people 
I talk to find it quite natural. Presumably redistributionists have a will 
ingness to trade off their personal welfare for that of others, and like all 
rational agents, are less interested in this tradeoff as its cost rises. That 
this preference should be given moral connotation is interesting, partic 
ularly if these preferences are dependent on the ethnic identity of the 
parties.
In any case, there are other ethical questions that redistribution 
raises. Let us return to our basic discussion of the transfer of funds 
from upper income to the lower. I do not think that in the real world a 
formal program with the announced objective of taking money from 
the poor to benefit the upper income as a way of getting faster growth 
will ever be adopted.
Turning to my example, it is not clear that the transfer is to the ben 
efit of the people at the bottom. But, as the reader will no doubt have 
already noticed, it depends to a considerable extent on the exact num 
bers that I have chosen. Suppose that the effect on growth were less. As 
far as I know we have no clear-cut measures of the degree to which 
transfers reduce growth. Suppose for example, it would be not 15 but 
150 years before the incomes of the bottom 20 percent would be as low 
or lower than they would be without the transfer.
The first thing to be said about this is that the out-of-pocket costs to 
the upper 80 percent would be exactly the same in the two different
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examples, and transfers of this sort are normally urged in terms of the 
desirability of the upper class sacrificing for the lower.
Members of the lower class could all assume that they would be 
dead by the time the change occurred, and so they and other poor peo 
ple would remain better off, indeed the children of the poor people, if 
they remained in the poorer class, would be better off. It would be the 
grandchildren and great grandchildren that would begin to suffer if 
families remained firmly fixed in poverty.
If we follow Barro and assume that people regarded their descen 
dants as important as themselves, then the period of crossover would 
be irrelevant. The poor person would worry about his or her descen 
dants in the year 3000 and would be opposed to the transfer. As far as I 
know no one except Barro actually believes that people behave that 
way. But if people do not, then on what moral authority do we transfer 
income from these future generations? Unlike the present generation of 
the wealthy, they have no democratic voice. They are entirely without 
representation, even though the burden of redistribution falls on them 
as surely as it falls on the present generation of wealthy citizens.
There are various numbers that would lead to the crossover point 
being somewhere between 15 and 150 and would lead to different atti 
tudes on the part of the present poor. With present data we cannot say 
exactly how long the period would be. It seems to me that this provides 
an incentive for getting better numbers.
Social Mobility, Relative Deprivation, and Other Conundra
We now turn to social mobility and subsequently to aversion. I have 
implicitly assumed that people who are at the bottom 20 percent or in 
the top 80 percent will stay there, and that they expect their children to 
do likewise. 6 This is not true in most societies, and certainly not in 
ours. The poor, in particular, tend to think that their children will do 
better in life than they themselves have done.
Circulation is to be expected, and we have an interesting asymmetry 
in the effects of this scheme. For the sake of illustration, assume that 
the average person in the bottom 20 percent believes that he will get 
out of it into the top 80 percent in 10 years. He will receive transfers
Poverty and Inequality 133
only for the first 10 years of the program. However, if the bottom 20 
percent moves up, one quarter of the top 80 percent must move down.
For people presently in the bottom 20 percent, the expected benefit 
from the transfer is therefore reduced. On the other hand, the possibil 
ity of falling into the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution less 
ens the injury that the transfer inflicts on upper income people. 
Whether or not social mobility makes transfers more likely from a pub 
lic choice perspective would depend on many factors.
Of course, the assumption of the change occurring at the end of 10 
years is arbitrary, and also the assumption that the entire bottom group 
goes up. If we wanted to make a more precise argument here we would 
need a little algebra, but in the absence of any numbers to put in equa 
tions it doesn't seem worthwhile elaborating it. The general principles 
for these simple numerical examples would continue to apply.
This brings us to the topic of risk aversion. The reader, we hope, will 
remember that risk aversion, and the justification for income redistribu 
tion from upper income people to lower based on it was the major 
theme of chapter 13 in The Calculus of Consent. 1 Since most people 
buy insurance at actuarially unfair prices, there is good reason to 
believe that most people are risk averse. Therefore, some kind of 
income insurance would be attractive to most people.
With risk aversion, even if everything we have said so far were true, 
we might get unanimous consent for an income redistribution scheme. 
It presumably would not be the kind of income redistribution we see in 
the United States, and other advanced countries in which you don't get 
help just because you are poor, but only if you are in certain appropri 
ate categories. The bureaucratic difficulties, which mean you fre 
quently don't get help at all until sometime after its need has become 
acute, would also be removed.
The first question is how much people are willing to pay for such 
insurance. The retarding of the growth rate of the income of the poor 
obviously makes it more expensive than in most traditional discus 
sions. However, a lot of this would depend on where you made your 
decision. You might make decisions today in favor of redistributing to 
the poor which 200 years from now your descendants will bitterly 
regret. It would be true even of poor descendants.
There is a metaphysical problem. Since risk is something that most 
people avoid, reducing the risk is a positive service for society. Unfor-
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tunately, it is not included in GNP, but for calculations such as we are 
making here we should at least mention the fact. It might be that the 
reduced growth rate shown in the figure is actually the growth with the 
service of risk reduction left out. It is not impossible, although I think it 
is unlikely, that the service of risk reduction, if included, could more 
than compensate for all the problems we have raised so far.
So far, I have merely discussed in a very vague way this particular 
problem. I think it would be thought of more, but it may be that it 
already has been thought of and carefully discussed in literature that I 
have not seen. To repeat, I hope any reader who knows of such litera 
ture will let me know. We will now turn to material that I know has 
been published before but that is needed to make this chapter even rea 
sonably complete.
Let us turn now to relative deprivation, and here I will be repeating 
arguments I have made before. 8 It is sometimes said that people are not 
interested particularly in their actual income but in their comparative 
income. An American living in Harlem is bothered more by the 
absence of a colored television which all the neighbors have than is a 
mother living in the Sahel when her child dies in a famine that takes the 
lives of many other children in her village.
You can see from my example that I regard it as basically an absurd 
proposition. I do not deny that to some extent it is true I can be jealous 
of people who are better off than I am, Harvard professors in particular. 
Indeed, I would think the fact that all the villagers are in danger of 
dying this way as a reason for increasing our worry about the matter 
rather than assuming that the parents don't mind.
To continue with my attack on the relative deprivation hypothesis, I 
usually refer to it as belief that if everybody has a toothache it doesn't 
really hurt. I should say that in my opinion this kind of feeling is pre 
dominantly an upper class one. We don't worry about starving, but we 
want to be respected by our acquaintances. This requires that our con 
sumption be at least up to community standards. If we were really 
poor, such matters would be less important. Even if it becomes psycho 
logically more important as we become wealthier, and the poor 
become better off, it is still a secondary effect. The people classified as 
poor in the United States have many privileges that Louis XIV would 
have liked.
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Let us ignore the lesser cases, and invent a very extreme example. 
Consider Mr. Jones. He lives in Newport, Rhode Island in the 1890s, 
and his private yacht is only 100 feet long. None of the people he asso 
ciates with have private yachts less than 200 feet long. The city fathers 
feel that this situation of relative deprivation cannot be tolerated. They 
put a tax on the wealthier people like J. Pierpont Morgan in order to 
supplement Mr. Jones' income so that he can have a yacht that is 150 
feet long. The result of this is greater equality among the yachtsmen of 
Newport, but the rest of the world as a whole is somewhat worse off if 
these very highly paid and presumably productive people work less 
hard in reaction to the tax. 9
It is hard to argue that this particular equalization of income is a 
good idea. I should say, however, that I have made this point in a num 
ber of lectures. Academia audiences normally showed signs of being 
unhappy, but did not otherwise respond. On one occasion, however, a 
professor did point out that in spite of the fact that poor people in the 
United States and the world were made worse off by this transfer of 
funds to Mr. Jones for a larger yacht, it might well have been true that 
the measured inequality of society would decline. This is true, but I 
have great difficulty believing anyone would support the policy for that 
reason.
There are, of course, reasons for the sort of behavior that I have been 
focusing on. Namely, a person may feel more strongly about the pov 
erty of people who live nearby than about the poverty of those living 
far away. Tucsonites would therefore be more concerned about the 
poor of Tucson than the poor of Mexico, and no one would be for 
equalizing American and African incomes. Interestingly, this particular 
hypothesis would seem to imply that most poverty relief should be ini 
tiated at a local level. For instance, the City of Tucson should take care 
of its poor, with possibly the State of Arizona providing some assis 
tance. But the federal government would be uninvolved in these pro 
grams.
It should be said that before the 1930s, aid to the poor was in fact 
administered locally. Liebergott's studies show that the poor did about 
as well relatively then as they do now. If people felt more strongly 
about the poor who are close, they would have done better. So to me, 
the situation remains a mystery.
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A student of mine, studying income tax returns, came to the conclu 
sion that the average American is willing to give about 5 percent of his 
income to the people who are worse off than he is. This is a rough fig 
ure and is only an average. Mother Cabrina gives more than 5 percent, 
and I am sure there are many people who give less. If you take the 
amount of money paid out by welfare states to the actual poor, let us 
define them as the bottom 10 percent, it usually turns out to be about 5 
percent of GNP. This is not surprising as, after all, the people who 
make the private charitable gifts are actually the people who vote for 
government charitable gifts. So, we get the same outcome in both 
areas.
These data have led me to a rule of thumb, which is simply that peo 
ple are willing to give away approximately 5 percent of their incomes 
for the aid of the poor and downtrodden. The whole thing is rather like 
dropping a stone into a bottomless pit. No one has ever complained 
about it. There are people who claim they give much more than 5 per 
cent, but I am a little skeptical in most cases. Yet the fact that some 
people give more than 5 percent is not surprising. There are also people 
who seem to think that any government transfer even if it goes to mil 
lionaire farmers is somehow a charitable gift. Although no one ever 
objects to my generalization, I am impressed by the fact that it is rare 
anyone even comments on it. Further, with one exception, no one ever 
cites this particular point of view. 10 Note, I am not saying that people 
refuse to believe. They never object to it. It is just something that is 
dropped into the memory hole.
If we move from the amount of money that people actually give 
away to what people say, they would appear to be much more charita 
ble than they actually are. Thus, the American government is accused 
of being heartless because it doesn't give even more money to the poor. 
Frequently moralists accuse the whole society of being unduly selfish. 
It is noteworthy then that in the 1980s—supposedly the decade of 
indulgence, selfishness, and greed—private contributions to charity 
rose more rapidly than in any other recent decade. The people who 
decry the Zeitgeist of selfishness never mention this.
I take a radically different attitude from most people. I observe peo 
ple saying that they are more charitable than they actually are, and crit 
icizing other people for not being more charitable than they actually 
are. The normal reaction is that we should all be nicer. My reaction is
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different. I think we should simply admit that we are all charitable, but 
not very much so. Since we don't seem to be able to get these charita 
ble contributions up above 5 percent, I would suggest that we simply 
admit this fact, and change what we say rather than what we do.
Economists normally think that what people do is a better measure 
of their preferences than what they say. Democratic governments are 
designed to give people what they want. By this is meant what they 
actually want, not what people say they want. I can think of all sorts of 
changes in the behavior of most groups which I think would be a good 
idea. We live in a democracy and democracies do what most people 
want, not what I want. I can vote like anyone else if I want to use it. 
Engaging in moral lectures on what people should want is a harmless 
activity, but it is also an unproductive one. Everyone is in favor of help 
ing the poor, at least a little bit. However, there is little discussion of 
the theoretical problems surrounding income transfers. I hope that 
these realities regarding the motivation for and effect of redistribution 
would be carefully considered before any drastic antipoverty measures 
are taken.
NOTES
1.1 am ignoring the point that was made by Browning and reinforced by other people that the 
transfer actually costs much more than the benefit. The reason is that it changes the behavior of 
both the victims and the people to whom it would be transferred It is not that I regard this as 
wrong or unimportant, but it is not necessary for this discussion.
2. Plus the top 80 percent.
3. Probably the best presentation of this point of view was by Stephen Marglin, "The Social 
Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, Febru 
ary 1963, pp 95-111 This argument was replied to by me in "The Social Rate of Discount and the 
Optimal Rate of Investment. Comment" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1968, 58 (4), pp. 
788-802 Marglin was also attacked by three other economists In fact, I think you can say that 
intellectually it is perhaps the most thoroughly demolished idea in the literature Nevertheless, the 
development economists held fast, and Marglin never formally changed position.
4. I trust the reader does not take this suggestion seriously enough so that I will be asked to 
explain what you do with those poor who literally die of starvation if they have to pay a tax. As a 
matter of fact, one could designate this a true negative income tax, not the fake negative income 
tax of the University of Chicago In this case the tax you paid would be under a certain income 
proportional to the degree you fell short of that income, and if you are above that certain income 
you would receive a supplement proportional to the degree you are above. It must be admitted that 
this scheme deserves the title "Negative Income Tax" better than the more traditional usage.
5 This is famous because of the expense of the bndge It should be said that like most World 
Bank projects it was well engineered You can feel confident that the bridge will not fall down, 
which is not necessarily true of the work of many of the other aid agencies.
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6.1 follow the normal nationalistic assumptions and consider only Americans Most people in 
the top 80 percent of most countries would be in the bottom 20 percent of ours
7. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1962, pp 189-201
8 The Economics of Income Redistribution, Dordrecht Kluwer, 1983.
9. Few of the wealthy people at that time inherited their money.
10 Martin Paldam is that exception
